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THE IMPACT OF DIVORCE AND SEPARATION ON
SECTION 18 OF THE DECEDENT ESTATE LAW
MALCOLM WILSON -
ORE than a quarter of a century has elapsed since the
I legislature radically changed the nature and incidents
of property rights born of and dependent upon the marital
relation, by abolishing the antiquated estates of dower and
curtesy.' These often illusory rights 2 were superseded by
legislation protecting a husband and wife against disinheri-
tance 3 and providing for a uniform system of descent and
distribution, under which a husband or wife would take a
substantial share of the estate of the other.4
The far-reaching importance of this fundamental legis-
lation warrants periodic study and discussion to determine
whether it has eliminated the defects in our prior estate
laws; 5 accomplished the legislative purpose of enlarging the
property rights of a surviving spouse; 8 and met the chal-
t Member of the New York Bar and Member of the New York State
Assembly.N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §§ 189-90.
2 The remarks of Surrogate James A. Foley, Chairman of the Decedent
Estate Commission, in an address to the New York State Bar Association, on
January 20, 1928, are pertinent: "The right of dower as it exists today is,
in most cases, an illusion and deception. The average person believes that it
gives one-third of the realty outright to the widow upon the death of her hus-
band, whereas, as we know, the law only gives to the widow a third of the
income of the real estate which her husband owned at his death .... It has
to a great extent been defeated by the present widespread system of taking
title to real estate, even of homes, in the name of a corporation instead of
the name of the individual .... Today, a wife can convey her individual real
estate without the consent of her husband. . . She has the right to defeat
his curtesy." 1928 La. Doc. No. 70, COMBINED REPORTS, COtMISSION' TO
INvESTIGATE DEFEcwTs IN THE LAWS OF ESTATES 145, 151-52 (reprinted 1935)
(hereinafter cited as COMBINED REPORTS).
3 N.Y. DEmc. EST. LAW § 18.41d. §83.
5 See 1930 LEG. Doc. No. 69, COMBINED REPORTS 225.
6 Laws of N.Y. 1929, c. 229. In adopting §§ 18 and 83 of the Decedent
Estate Law, as recommended by the Decedent Estate Commission, the legis-
lature announced its intention to be ". . . to increase the share of a surviving
spouse, either in the case of intestacy, or by an election against the terms of
the will, thus enlarging the property rights of such spouse."
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lenge of any new problems that may have arisen since its
enactment.
THE STATUTE
The subject of this article requires a somewhat detailed
analysis of subdivisions three, four and five of Section 18
which provide as follows:
(3) The right of election shall not be available to a spouse against
whom or in whose favor a final decree or judgment of divorce
recognized as valid by the law of the state has been rendered,
or against whom a final decree or judgment of separation rec-
ognized as valid by the laws of this state has been rendered.
Nor shall such right of election be available to a spouse who
has procured without the State of New York a final decree or
judgment dissolving the marriage with the testator where such
a decree or judgment is not recognized as valid by the law of
this State.
(4) No husband who has neglected or refused to provide for his wife,
or who has abandoned her, shall have the right of such an
election.
(5) No wife who has abandoned her husband shall have the right
of such an election.
Notice the seeming anomaly between the denial of the
right of election to a spouse who had procured a judgment
of divorce and the allowance of such right to a spouse who
had obtained a judgment of separation (subd. three).
Is there sufficient justification for this distinction?
Observe that, in the case of a "divorce recognized as valid
by the law of the state," no distinction is made between the
innocent and the guilty spouse; the right of election is barred
whether the decree be in favor of or against the surviving
spouse. At the same time consider that, while certain mari-
tal misconduct (abandonment by the wife or husband, or the
husband's refusal or neglect to provide for his wife) dis-
qualifies a spouse, unfaithfulness per se does not.7
In Matter of Green, 155 Misc. 641, 645, 280 N.Y. Supp. 692, 697 (Surr.
Ct.), aff'd, 246 App. Div. 583, 284 N.Y. Supp. 370 (1st Dep't 1935), Surrogate
Delehanty upheld the § 18 right of election of a widow who had had adulterous
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Is there legal justification for the denial of the right of
election to a faithful wife who had secured a valid judgment
of divorce because of her husband's adultery, and the con-
ference (negatively) of such right on an adulterous wife,
whose marriage had not been dissolved and who had not
abandoned her husband?
EFFECT OF DIVORCE AND SEPARATION UPON DOWER
As background for our inquiries, there is available a con-
siderable body of law developed prior to 1930, involving the
effect of marital disruption upon the estate of dower. The
New York Statute of Dower endowed the widow with a
one-third part of all lands of which her husband was seized
of an estate of inheritance at any time during marriage, and
provided for disendowment "in case of a divorce dissolving
the marriage contract for the misconduct of the wife." 8 The
courts removed all doubt of the "misconduct" intended by
the legislature by holding that the "misconduct" referred to
in the statute meant adultery only and that her misconduct
thus interpreted must be established by a judgment or
decree.9
The principle having been established that only a divorce
for adultery barred a wife's dower, it necessarily followed
relations with another man, after having been willfully abandoned by her hus-
band, stating: "It is useful . .. to see whether fidelity is made a test of the
right of election and to see what matrimonial misconduct does not disqualify
the spouse to make an election. . The first and most notable fact is that the
right of election is secured to every spouse-even an adulterous one-who
continues to live in the matrimonial domicile and who is not guilty of aban-
donment. Next is the fact that the spouse (not guilty of abandonment) who
has been guilty of cruel and inhuman treatment which would have warranted
the deceased spouse in obtaining a separation is not barred from the right of
election. Again the spouse (not guilty of abandonment) whose conduct made
it unsafe and improper for the deceased spouse to cohabit with the survivor
is entitled to elect. The status of surviving spouse is all that need be estab-
lished by any of these three." To the same effect, a wife who is not guilty
of abandoning her husband is entitled to her intestate share in her husband's
estate under § 83 even though she committed adultery. See Matter of Schinzing,
2 M.2d 661, 150 N.Y.S.2d 305 (Surr. Ct. 1957).
8 N.Y. REAL PRoP. LAW §§ 190, 196.
9 Dower was not barred by adultery, nor even by an interlocutory decree
of divorce, which had not become final prior to the husband's death. Van Cleaf
v. Bums, 118 N.Y. 549, 23 N.E. 881 (1890); id. 133 N.Y. 540, 30 N.E. 661
(1892); Bryon v. Bryon, 134 App. Div. 320, 119 N.Y. Supp. 41 (2d Dep't
1909). See also note 7 supra.
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that a limited divorce amounting to a judicial separation of
the parties from bed and board did not have such effect.' 0
It was early decided that a wife who had procured a
judgment of divorce in the courts of this state, founded upon
her husband's adultery, was entitled to dower in lands left
by her former husband." The wife's right to dower in such
circumstances was later expressly preserved by statute. 2
Her right in such case attached only to property of which
her husband was seized up to the time of the decree; it did
not attach to lands which he acquired after the divorce, since
the requisite of seisen during coverture was lacking.13
In 1922, it was held that a wife who had procured a
final judgment of divorce in another state, not recognized as
valid by the courts of this state, was not entitled to dower
in lands acquired by her husband prior to the divorce.' 4
HISTORY OF SUBDIVISIONs 3, 4 AND 5 OF SECTION 18
In the report submitted to the legislature in 1928 by the
Commission to Investigate Defects in the Laws of Estates,
the Commission said:
The Commission proposes also to safeguard this right of election
by protecting only the faithful wife. It proposes to exclude from its
benefits a wife who is guilty of abandonment or who has been deprived
of or who has obtained release from her marital status.' 5
10 Crain v. Cavana, 62 Barb. 109 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1862).
11 Wait v. Wait, 4 N.Y. 95 (1850).
12 N.Y. Civ. PRac. Acr § 1156.
3 Van Blaricum v. Larson, 205 N.Y. 355, 98 N.E. 488 (1912).
14 In Monroe County Say. Bank v. Yeoman, 119 Misc. 226, 229, 195 N.Y.
Supp. 531, 534 (Sup. Ct. 1922), the wife who sought dower rights was married
in New York and continued to live there with her husband until she left him
to go to Ohio to get a divorce. In Ohio, a final judgment of divorce was
granted to her on a ground not recognized in New York. Her husband had
been served by publication but had not appeared. The court held that she had
thereby forfeited dower -in lands acquired by him before the divorce and
stated: "The marriage contract upon which the applicant predicates this mo-
tion was completely dissolved as to her. . . . Since her husband had done no
wrong there was no residuum of marital rights or obligations. Being no
longer a wife she had no capacity of becoming a widow. This is not hostile
to the principle in Wait v. Wait . . . where the court was speaking of the
effect of a divorce in this state for the husband's misconduct. . .
15 1928 LEG. Doc. No. 70, COMBINED REPORTS 20.
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The Commission submitted proposed legislation in con-
formity with its report and appended to the proposed new
Section 18 of the Decedent Estate Law a note, which included
the following:
The provisions of the section deny a right of election to either
a widow or surviving husband in the following cases:
(a) Where a final judgment or decree of absolute divorce has
been rendered which is recognized by the law of this state. The
words "recognized by the law of this state" are intended to mean
the recognition by the highest court of this state of the validity of
such a judgment or decree procured in this state, or in another state
or in a foreign country. At the present time, a former husband or
wife after an absolute divorce is not entitled to letters of adminis-
tration or to a distributive share in the estate of the other. [Matter
of Ensign, 103 N.Y. 284; Matter of Albrecht,.118 Misc. 737, 119
Misc. 554.]
(b) Where either husband or wife as plaintiff has procured a
judgment or decree dissolving the marriage, in another state or in a
foreign country, which is not recognized by the laws of this state.
Such a judgment or decree should act as an estoppel against the one
procuring it (notwithstanding it is not accorded recognition by the
courts of this state) as held in Monroe County Savings Bank v.
Yeoman, 119 Misc. 226.
(c) Where either husband or wife has abandoned the other or
the husband has refused or neglected to provide for the wife. Such
an abandonment or refusal or neglect to provide, is intended, as our
courts uphold, as sufficient to sustain a judgment of separation under
section 1161 of the Civil Practice Act.' 6
In 1929, the legislature adopted subdivisions three, four
and five of Section .18, as proposed by the Commission. Sig-
nificantly the legislature, at the same time, adopted the new
Section 87 of the Decedent Estate Law, which barred suc-
cession in intestacy
... to a spouse against whom or in whose favor a final decree or
judgment of divorce recognized as valid by the law of this state has
been rendered; or to a spouse who has procured without the state
of New York a final decree or judgment dissolving the marriage with
16 d. at 31-32.
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the decedent, where such decree or judgment is not recognized as
valid by the law of this state.17
In 1934, succession in intestacy was further limited when
the legislature denied a distributive share to a
* . . husband who has neglected or refused to provide for his wife,
or has abandoned her; or to a wife who has abandoned her husband.' 8
It is significant to note that the right of election is barred
to the unsuccessful defendant in a separation action, whereas
the mere fact that there is a judicial decree of separation does
not bar an intestate succession. 19
Is THERE SUFFICIENT JUSTIFICATION FOR THE DENIAL
OF THE R1IGHT OF ELECTION TO A SPOUSE WHO HAD
PROCURED A DIvORCE, VALID IN THIS STATE, AND
ITS ALLOWANCE TO A SPOUSE WHO HAD PROCURED
A SEPARATION?
Prerequisite to the right of election is the existence of
the marital relation at the time of the wife's or husband's
death. 0 The legislature followed well-established legal doc-
trines in denying the right of election to a spouse who had
procured a judgment of divorce "recognized as valid' by the
courts of this state." The effect of such a divorce is to destroy
completely the relation of husband and wife.2 1  From the
17 Laws of N.Y. 1929, c. 229, § 6.
18 Laws of N.Y. 1934, c. 216, § 2.
19 Compare N.Y. DFCED. EST. LAW § 18(3), with N.Y. DECED. EST. LAW
§ 87.
20 In Matter of Adams, 182 Misc. 937, 942, 45 N.Y.S.2d 494, 499 (Surr. Ct.
1943), aff'd mem., 276 App. Div. 985, 48 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1st Dep't), inotion for
leave to appeal denied, 293 N.Y. 931, 60 N.E.2d 134 (1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S.
865 (1945), in which it was held that a divorce by a wife in Nevada, following
a trial at which the parties appeared, barred her right of election, Surrogate
Foley said: "The intention of the legislature in the enactment of section 18
of the Decedent Estate Law and in conferring a right of election or providing
for its denial as to certain spouses, plainly contemplated that the factual situa-
tion at the death of the testator or testatrix was to be the test. Where a decree
of divorce had been obtained by the surviving former spouse, which stood un-
affected at such death, the right to elect had been destroyed."
21 The remarks of the Court of Appeals in Matter of Ensign, 103 N.Y.
284, 287-88, 8 N.E. 544, 546 (1886), are pertinent. In that case, a wife who
had procured a divorce in New York State contended that she was entitled
to a share in the estate of her husband who had died intestate. Her claim was
rejected; the court ruled that only the lawful wife at the death of the de-
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date of the decree, no existing and vested rights are forfeited,
except by express statutory mandate, but since the relation
terminates, no future marital rights can arise for either.
Section 18 does not give a husband or a wife an estate or in-
terest of any kind in the property of the other at the time of
the acquirement, but only an expectant interest in the estate
of the other which ceases to exist when the marriage is
dissolved.22
It is to be remembered that prior to the enactment of
Section 18, the innocent wife was allowed dower in lands of
which the husband was seized before the divorce, on the
theory that although the marriage had been dissolved, the
decree operated prospectively only and had no retroactive
effect upon her inchoate dower which had already become a
vested right.23
Consider the possibilities if Section 18 made provision
for the innocent divorced wife. At the death of her former
husband she may be the lawful wife of another. The de-
ceased may have lawfully remarried. Who would prevail
in the struggle between the divorced wife and the second
wife of the deceased? Suppose he had remarried more than
once? Section 18 deliberately contemplates the possible ex-
istence of but one "surviving spouse" in order to avoid the
complexities and bitterness of such a lawsuit.
The legislature, logically, conferred the privilege of elec-
tion upon a spouse who had procured a judgment of separa-
tion. It is well settled that such a judgment does not
dissolve the marriage relation of the parties; they remain
husband and wife in the eyes of the law as well as in the
eyes of their friends and neighbors. 24 The marriage remains
in full force and effect and whatever rights each has in the
estate of the other are unaffected by the decree. 25 Although
cedent could take a statutory share of the personal estate of her husband.
The court stated: "The relation of husband and wife, both actual and legal,
is utterly destroyed, and no future rights can thereafter spring out of or arise
from it. . . . But future rights dependent upon the marital relation and born
of it there can be none."2 2 Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937), citing Leonard
v. Leonard, 181 Mass. 458, 63 N.E. 1068 (1902).
23 Van Blaricum v. Larson, 205 N.Y. 355, 360, 98 N.E. 488, 489 (1912).
2 4 Jardine v. O'Hare, 66 Misc. 33, 122 N.Y. Supp. 463 (Sup. Ct. 1910).
25 Note, however, that § 18(3) expressly denies the right of election to a
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the decree authorizes complete cessation of cohabitation, the
parties can, sua sponte, restore complete marital status by
reconciliation. 2 6
It must be apparent that it is the opinion of the writer
that there is actually nothing anomalous in the denial and
the conference of the right of election in these two situations,
but, on the contrary, that there is ample justification for
the same.
Is THERE LEGAL JUSTIFICATION FOR THE DENIAL OF
THE RIGHT OF ELECTION TO AN INNOCENT WIFE WHO
HAD DIVORCED HER HUSBAND FOR ADULTERY AND THE
CONFERENCE OF SUCH RIGHT ON AN ADULTEROUS
WIFE, WHO HAD NOT BEEN DIVORCED AND HAD NOT
ABANDONED HER HUSBAND?
The Decedent Estate Commission said it "proposes also
to safeguard this right of election by protecting only the
faithful Wife." 27 In Matter of Green,28 it was contended
that this description required the court to hold that an un-
faithful spouse might not elect. After examining the Civil
Practice Act and the Decedent Estate Law to see whether
fidelity is the test of the right of election, Surrogate
Delehanty said:
That the reference to the "faithful wife" has no meaning such as is
ascribed to it by the executors and the legatees of the deceased is
evident from the sentence immediately following that in which the
word is used. The Commission there says: "It proposes to exclude
from its benefits a wife who is guilty of abandonment or who has been
deprived of or who has obtained release from her marital status."
Thus it is evident that the Commission has in substance defined the
word "faithful" 'by saying, negatively at least, that a spouse is
"faithful" if not guilty of abandonment, if not chargeable with having
".. . spouse against whom a final decree or judgment of separation recognized
as valid by the laws of this state has been rendered .... " N.Y. DECED. EsT.
LAW § 18(3).
26 Matter of Smith, 243 App. Div. 348, 350, 276 N.Y. Supp. 646, 649 (4th
Dep't 1935).
27 1928 LEG. Doc. No. 70, COMBINED REPORTS 20 (emphasis added).
28 155 Misc. 641, 280 N.Y. Supp. 692 (Surr. Ct.), aff'd, 246 App. Div. 583,
284 N.Y. Supp. 370 (1st Dep't 1935).
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gone outside this state to get a divorce not recognized here and if
no judgment of divorce or separation has been rendered in our courts
against him or her.29
Perhaps any reluctance the learned surrogate may have
felt in the Green case in permitting the adulterous wife to
elect was neutralized by the evidence presented as to the
husband's own misconduct. Prior to her misbehavior, the
husband had deserted his wife in a foreign country, without
resources, in favor of a mistress, and thereafter had con-
cealed his whereabouts from his wife. However, it would
appear from the court's reasoning that the decision would
have been the same even if the husband had been blameless.
Essentially the decision is bottomed on the premise that
where the marriage relation persists and no judgment of
separation has been procured against the wife, nothing but
the fact of abandonment of her husband by the wife is the bar.
While it seerms strange that Section 18 allows the right
of election to the adulterous wife whose marital status re-
mains undisturbed, but denies the right to an innocent wife
who divorces her husband for his misconduct, examination
discloses that the legislative enactment harmonizes with the
ancient rule that adultery alone did not bar dower but that
adultery established by a judgment did. Dower was barred
as a consequence of the judgment of divorce founded upon
the fact of adultery, and not as a consequence of the offense
without the judgment.3 0 So too, Section 18 does not bar the
right of election for adultery alone but denies the privilege
as a consequence of a valid judgment of divorce, founded
upon adultery or other grounds. The judgment destroying
the marital relation is made the bar.
In denying the right of election to a former wife who
had procured a "valid" judgment of divorce the legislature
is, again, sustained by long existing precedent. Prior to the
establishment of the present system of descent and distribu-
tion, it was the well settled law of this state that a former
wife, however innocent, had no right to a distributive share
29 id. at 648, 280 N.Y. Supp. at 698.
30 See Schiffer v. Pruden, 64 N.Y. 47, 51 (1876).
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in the personal estate of her divorced husband, upon his death
intestate.
31
Whether or not so intended, the legislature ameliorated
what many may have considered a harsh rule by amending
Section 1161 of the Civil Practice Act to add as a ground
for the maintenance of an action for a judgment of sep-
aration "the commission of an act of adultery by the
defendant .... ,, 32 Prior to its enactment a husband or wife
wronged by the unfaithfulness of his or her spouse could in-
stitute an action for divorce only at the risk of being deprived
of the right to elect as a "surviving spouse" under Section 18.
By adding adultery as a ground for legal separation, the
legislature has spelled out a way for the wronged spouse to
retain the right to share in the estate of the offender while
depriving the latter of any right to share in the estate of
the former.
31 Cf. Matter of Ensign, 103 N.Y. 284, & N.E. 544 (1886), cited by the
Commission to the legislature, in support of its recommendation that a former
husband or wife after an absolute divorce recognized as valid by the law of
this state should be denied the right of election.
32 Laws of N.Y. 1947, c. 774.
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